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25. And if a house be divided against itself, that house
cannot stand. Mark 3:25.
T HE settlement of labor disputes has been called this country's
most critical postwar domestic problem.' At a time when the
public in general is concerned with problems of inflation and
foreign affairs, little patience is accorded legitimate labor dis-
putes where the goal sought is higher wages and better working
conditions. It is to be expected therefore that those strikes caused
by quarreling between crafts over jurisdictional matters are sorely
condemned.' The legislative product of the current public senti-
ment on labor matters is the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947! One of the objects of the new law is to provide govern-
mental machinery for the settlement of disputes existing within
the family of labor. Considerable doubt exists as to the wisdom
of injecting the bureaucracy of government into the internal af-
fairs of labor organizations. As one Senator has said, the Amer-
ican people are expecting entirely too much of labor legislation
as a panacea for industrial ills.'
I Preface, 12 LAW & CONTEMt. PROB. 209 (1947).
2
"It is time for unions themselves to consider some things other than just who will
represent a certain group. and thus start these jurisdictional strikes and cause serious
unemployment of the very laboring classes they are primarily supposed to represent and
help. I fear that by such continued activities they will bring down upon themselves
reactionary legislation which is always bad legislation,..." American Chain & Cable Co.
Inc. v. Truck Drivers and Ilelpers Union. Local 676, AFL, 68 F. Supp. 54 (D. C. N. J.
1946).
"There is no form of labor warfare so opposed to public interest and to the interest
of organized labor itself as the jurisdictional strike which stops the commerce of an
employer who is trying to be fair to organized labor." U. S. v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 600
(E. D. Mo. 1940) afl'd, 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
3Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Congress, 1st Sess. (June 23, 1947) (popularly known as the
Taft-Hartley Law). In his veto message to Congress on June 20, 1947, President Truman
said: "This bill is perhaps the most serious economic and social legislation of the past
decade. Its effects--for good or ill-would be felt for decades to come." The bill was
passed over the President's veto.
4 Senator Wayne Morse, Oregon, A Realistic Approach to Labor Legislation, 14 U. of
CHt. L. REv. 337 (1947).
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Jurisdictional disputes between the craft labor unions are as
old as the organized labor movement itself, having existed since
the time of medieval guilds! However, prior to the passage of re-
cent legislation it was exceedingly questionable if there was any
legal machinery available, judicial, quasi-judicial, or administra-
tive, for the final disposition of these cases. It is curious that such
a long standing problem has not been attacked with more vigor
and determination by those concerned with harmonious labor rela-
tions. The purpose of this article is to examine some of the salient
features of the jurisdictional dispute, both from the standpoint of
past failures in handling such disputes and the new legislation at-
tempting a solution.
The term "jurisdictional dispute" has been applied to both
intra-union and inter-union conflicts. The loose application of the
term has been unfortunate as it has served to confuse two different,
if not distinct, types of labor disputes. In the true jurisdictional
conflict, the question is: which union is going to get certain avail-
able work-the carpenters or the machinists?' The question in
the inter-union dispute is: who is going to represent certain em-
ployees-an AFL, CIO, or some independent union?' Inter-union
conflict is a result of national labor organizations competing for
new members. This is dual unionism. But when both of the con-
tending unions are members of the same national organization, a
conflict exists which is beyond the functional purpose of labor
unions. It is difficult for unions to justify the necessity for the eco-
nomic loss caused thereby. While this article will comment upon
3 WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEZMOCRACy 510 (1902).
s "Strikes of this sort occur frequently when the same employer hires members of two
different craft unions to work for him at the same time. For instance, a general building
contractor puts carpenters to hanging metal doors and the metal workers, who are
engaged elsewhere on the operation, strike because they are not given this work to do.
They claim that the work should be theirs because they have always installed materials
made of metal. And the carpenters claim that the work is properly theirs because they
have always hung doors, even if they had always been made of wood. If the general con-
tractor gives the job to the metal workers, the carpenters will strike. If he does not, the
metal workers will remain on strike. In either event the whole operation may come to a
halt." GR ORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 113 (1946).
7 Id. at 317.
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the true jurisdictional or intra-union dispute, some of the case ma-
terial cited does not involve necessarily the aspects of a true juris-
dictional dispute. However, it is believed that the principles of law
in those cases are applicable to the topic under discussion here.
A case having the typical elements of a jurisdictional dispute is
that of Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan.8 This suit was brought in
a federal district court by the employer requesting that an injunc-
tion be issued against the Teamsters' Union of the AFL. The
drivers and helpers used by the employer in delivering his product
were members of the Brewery Workers' Union, an industrial or
vertical type union in the brewing industry. The Brewery Workers'
Union has been in and out of the AFL because of its controversy
with the Teamsters; the fight has been continuing in the brewing
industry of the nation for fifty years.9 Because the Brewery Work-
ers' Union refused to give up the drivers and helpers in the brew-
ing industry to the Teamsters, it was expelled from the AFL in
1941.
The Teamsters' Union, claiming to represent a majority of the
drivers and helpers employed in plaintiff's brewery, requested
recognition from the employer as the exclusive bargaining agent
of such employees. Recognition was refused on the grounds that
there was an existing contract between the company and the Brew-
ery Workers' Union. A petition was subsequently filed by the
Teamsters with the National Labor Relations Board (hereafter
referred to as the Board and the NLRB) for an election to deter-
mine the proper bargaining representative for the plaintiff's em-
ployees. The NLRB directed that the requested election be held,
but the Teamsters refused to participate in the election when they
learned that the election would not be held on a craft basis. The
Teamsters filed a strike notice and thereafter went on strike. The
plaintiff's brewery had been closed down since the strike began
8 59 F. Supp. 625 (D. C. Minn. 1945).
9 For a history of the dispute between the Teamsters and Brewery Workers' Union, see
Jaffe, Inter-Union Disputes in Search of a Forum, 49 YALE: L J. 424 (1940).
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because of the refusal of other AFL workers to go through the
picket lines of the Teamsters.
The court refused to issue the injunction holding that while the
minority union has no standing as the collective bargaining agent
of the employees covered by the election held by the NLRB, it
may strike or otherswise manifest dissatisfaction or opposition to
results of the election, notwithstanding the certificate of the NLRB
designating the Brewery Workers' Union as the sole bargaining
agent, so long as the minority union pursues lawful means of pub-
licizing its grievance. The strikers, said the court, have the unques-
tioned right to inform their fellow members of the AFL, as well as
the public, that they are on strike in protest against representation
by the Brewery Workers' Union. Further, it was said that no court
has authority to order the striking Teamsters back to work.
Injunctive relief was denied the employer because the court
found the existence of a "labor dispute" as defined in the federal
anti-injunction statute.10 However, the court was very sympathetic,
saying,
"Although plaintiff's predicament has strong, appealing equities, we
find ourselves without authority to grant relief. The situation presented
strongly emphasizes the extreme one-sidedness of the National Labor
Relations Act legislation; that is, the employer is bound to comply
with the orders of the Board, but the employees are free to flount the
Board's decision and create the anomalous and often calamitous situ-
ation of an employer's being caught, without fault on his part. between
the upper and nether millstones."
The principal reason for the present importance of the jurisdic-
tional dispute is the rapid growth of trade unionism as fostered
by favorable governmental policies. Recent Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics figures show that approximately 75% of all workers in all
industries are presently embraced under one form or another of
union-security agreement.1 Few realize just how rapid this growth
has been; one should consider that in 1900 trade union member-
10 NORRis-LAGUARDIA AcT, 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. H§ 101-115 (1940).
11 Thatcher, Shall We Have Mre Regulation of the Internal Affairs of Labor Unions?
7 LAw. GuFLD Rzv. 14, 16 (1947).
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ship in the United States was 868,500, in 1932 it was 3,298,000,"
and in 1947 it was estimated to be 15,000,000 members. 3 One
could not expect that such a period of rapid growth could be
bridged without some "growing pains."
The courts have aggravated the difficulty by applying to unions
the rules of law applicable to the social and sick benefit societies
of the 19th century. 4 Decisions of the duly constituted governing
body of a labor organization made in accordance with its constitu-
tion and bylaws generally will not be set aside by the courts.' At
the outset the NLRB refused to decide intra-union disputes stating
that its purpose was to encourage collective bargaining and protect
the rights of employees, not to decide matters which unions should
be able to decide for themselves.'
RESORT TO INTRA-UNION TRIBUNALS
Both the AFL and CIO have provisions in their constitutions for
the settlement of jurisdictional disputes.' And a large number of
these disputes are settled by the arbitration machinery of the par-
ent union.'" Settlements are made through negotiation and confer-
12 8 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 41 (1935).
'a METZ AND JACOBSTEIN, A NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 31 (1947).
14 Comment, 7 U. OF Ptr. L. REv. 221 (1941).
15 In California State Brewers' Institute v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers, 19 F. Supp. 824 (N. D. Cal. 1937), the court said:
"Decisions reached by labor unions according to their own constitution and by-laws of
procedure are not to be invalidated by a court of law, provided that all parties have had
the opportunity to be heard, that tbe decision has not been arbitrary, and that the funda-
mental law of the association has not been violated." .crord, Screurnen's Benevolent
Association v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552, 13 S. W. 379 (1890).
16 This rule was expressed in the case of Aluminum Company of America, I N. L R.
B. 530, 537-8 (1936). The Board said: "It is preferable that the Board should not inter-
fere with the internal affairs of labor organizations. Self-organization oi employees
implies a policy of self-management. The role that organizations of employees eventually
must play in the structure established by Congress through that Act is a large and vital
one. They will best be able to perform that role if they are permitted freely to work out
the solutions to their own internal problems." The same policy was expressed in Axton-
Fisher Tobacco Co. I N. L. R. B. 604 (1936) and Curtis Bay Towing Co., 4 N. L. R. B.
360 (1937).
'T AFL Constitution Art. IX, Sections 11 and 12. CIO Constitution Art. V1, Section 6.
Is When a conflict occurs between two AFL unions, the two parent craft unions try to
settle it directly. If necessary they take it to the Executive Council of the AFL. The'Coun-
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ences. The AFL particularly has followed a Fabian policy of
persuasion. It is not uncommon to find the national body unable
to control the controversy, and the matter extends on intermin-
ably.' The AFL has been involved in the most notable jurisdic-
tional disputes,20 and several reasons are advanced as a partial
exp]anation:
(1) The AFL is only a loose confederacy. "
(2) Early craft charters define jurisdiction broadly.2"
(3) Both parties frqeuently have just claims. 2 "
(4) Strong unions are favored and small unions coerced into
accepting a ruling.2'
(5) The Federation will rarely use its power to revoke the
charter of runions who refuse to abide by its decision. -5
Negotiations between the lithographers' and the photo-engravers'
unions have been conducted for more than twenty years and be-
tween the teamsters and the brewery workers for more than twenty-
five years. The prolonged duration of these disputes illustrates
the weakness of adjudication by the internal tribunals. Failing to
cil usually sets up a subcommittee on which neither of the two unions are represented.
In making a recommendation to the Council, the committee gives great weight to how
effectively each union can organize in the disputed field. This factor may override the fact
that the field is not covered in the successful union's charter. The decision of the execu-
tive Council is binding, but some cases have been appealed to the convention. A good
many decisions have been defied by strong national unions. In 1946 the AFL convention
rejected a resolution requiring arbitration of jurisdictional disputes.
The CIO Executive Board has a three-man Jurisdictional Committee whose decisions
may be appealed to the convention.
I .Jaffe, supra, note 9, at 443.
20 Because of the craft organization of the AFL, this body is more vulnerable to juris-
dictional disputes than the industrial type union, e.g., the CIO. But while demarcation
disputes are most common among the skilled trades, the CIO has not entirely eliminated
them. There have been jurisdictional disputes between the shipbuilders and the long-
shoremen over the organization of ship scalers, between automobile and agricultural
implement workers over the organization of employees in plants producing agricultural
machinery, and a serious dispute between the department store employees' union and the
longshoremen over organizing warehousemen.
22 Note, 49 YALE L J. 329 (1939).
22 Rottenberg, Intra-Union Disputes Over Job Control, 61 Q. J. EcoN. 619 (1947).
23 Comment, 7 U. OF PiTT. L Rnv. 221 (1941).
2, Jaffe, supra note 9, at 434.
2 5 Coment, 7 U. oF Prrr. L Rzv. 221 (1941).
(Vol. 2
IURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
obtain a satisfactory solution to its problems from the parent or-
ganization, one of the unions usually petitions the courts and ad-
ministrative agencies for relief from attacks by its adversary.
RESORT TO THE COURTS
Jurisdictional disputes are brought into the courts upon applica-
tion for a protective injunction by the employer whose property is
endangered and operations interfered with, or by the labor union
whose contract with the employer the defendant union is attempt-
ing to break. "8 In the absence of statutes restraining the court from
granting injunctions where labor disputes are involved, courts of
equity have little hesitancy in finding it necessary to protect prop-
erty rights27 or an existing contract between the employer and the
incumbent union."
There are no statutes restrictring the granting of injunctions in
labor disputes in Texas. The Texas injunction statute is quite broad
in its scope and provides that relief may be granted where the ap-
plicant is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief or any
part thereof requires the restraint of some act prejudicial to him."9
And the courts have been careful to point out that while there are
statutes that declare it to be lawful for employees to organize and
strike against their employer,"0 yet these statutes specifically pro-
2 Ibid.
27 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921) ; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895) ; Amer-
ican Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' and Die Makers' Unions, etc., 90 Fed. 608 (C. C.
N. D. Ohio 1898); Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Machine Works, 131 Ga. 336, 62 S. E.
236 (1908).
2 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917). Also see note in
6 T x.L. R~v. 402 (1928). In Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 138 S. W. (2d)
223,226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error refused, the sourt said: "... That our courts of equity
will, in proper cases affecting labor organizations or unions, as well as any other litigants,
grant protective injunctions where that relief is necessary to the continued preservation
and enjoyment of an existing contract between parties having a legal right to make and
live under it, as against third persons who sustain no relation either to such parties
thereto or to the contract itself." Accord: Borden Co. v. Local No. 133 of International
Brotherhood of Teamstears, Chauffeurs, Stablemen & Helpers of America, 152 S. W. (2d)
828, 832 (Tex.1 Civ. App. 1941) error refused.
29 Tax REV. Ctv. STAT. (1925) art. 4642, § 1.




vide that nothing shall be construed to repeal, affect or diminsh
the force and effect of any statute on the subject of trusts and con-
spiracies against trade.'"
That Texas would grant injunctive relief in a jurisdictional dis.
pute, even prior to recent legislation, : is illustrated by the recent
case of International Association of Machinists Lodge 1488 v.
Downtown Employees Association." In that case a local craft
union undertook to organize the employees of a garage and to
obtain from the employer a contract which required that all em-
ployees belong to or join the union. Instead the employees formed
their own union and upon a showing that a majority of the em.
ployees favored the company union, a contract was drawn up by
the employer. Twenty-three out of twenty-five employees signed
the contract. The craft union authorized a strike against the em-
plover unless a previously discharged union member was rein-
stated with back pay and unless the company signed the contract
under which all employees must belong to the union. Failing in
their demands, the union placed pickets on the sidewalks in front
of the company's place of business. The picketing continued for
five months until restrained by an injunction granted upon the peti-
tion of the employer and the company union. On appeal the craft
union, seeking to dissolve the injunction, contended that the in-
junction should not have been granted because the peaceful picket.
ing engaged in by the appellant resulted from the existence of a
bona fide labor dispute between it and the employer. The union
also claimed denial of free speech. But the appellate court af-
firmed the decision of the lower court and held that a finding that
the picketing engaged in, by the appellant union did cause sub-
stantial loss to the company and would continue to cause such loss
was sufficient reason to continue the injunction.
31 Cooks'. Waiters' and Waitre.%ses' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S. W. 1086 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921).
"= See note 88 intra.
s 204 S. W. (2d) 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) writ of error refused, no reversible error.
Accord, Dallas General Drivers, Watehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 745 v.
Oak Cliff Baking Co., 203 S. W. (2d) 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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The Texas courts have consistently held that a union which
represents no employees is an "outsider" and may be enjoined
from peacefully picketing an employer.3' In some of the cases so
holding the employees were already represented by another union,
and interference with contractual relations was an added ground
for injunction. One may fairly infer that a union which engages in
a jurisdictional strike and pickets an employer because of his con-
tractual relations with another union would be subject to injunc-
tion. It is by no means clear that such an injunction would violate
the right of free speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."5
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed, after Section 20 of the
Clayton Act3" proved ineffective, to restrict the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts to grant protective injunctions where a "labor dis-
pute ' 7 was found to exist. The Act permits injunctive relief in a
"labor dispute," which is broadly defined, only on prescribed con-
ditions and after findings of fraud, violence, or wilful trespass
upon property. About eighteen states have anti-injunction statutes
similar to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.3
s
34 Webb v. Cooks', Waiters' and Waitresses' Union No. 748, 205 S. W. 465 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918) ; Cooks', Waiters' and Waitresses' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S. W. 1086
(Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Culinary Workers' Union No. 331 v. Fuller, 105 S. W. (2d) 295
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; International Assn. of Machinists Union, Local No. 1488 v. Fed-
erated Assn. of Accessory Workers, 109 S. W. (2d) 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; Henke &
Pillot, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers, etc., 109 S. W. (2d) 1083 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937) ; Texas Motion Picture Operators, etc. v. Galveston Motion Picture
Operators, etc., 132 S. W. (2d) 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ; Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S. W.
(2d) 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) ; Carpenters and Joiners Union V. Ritter's Cafe, 138
S. W. (2d) 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), 149 S. W. (2d) 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) a±Td
315 U. S. 722 (1941) ; Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union
745 v. Oak Cliff Baking Co., note 33 supra; International Assn. of Machinists Lodge 1488
v. Downtown Employees Assn., note 33 supra.
5 Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1941).
3638STAr. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1940).
37 "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee." NoRmRs-LAGUARDIA ACT, 47 STAr. 73 c. 90, § 13; 29 U. S. C. § 113 (c)
(1940).
38 Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Min-
nesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Anti-injunction statutes of more limited scope exist in the
following states: Illinois, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Maine, Montana, and Rhode Island.
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The decisions are divided as to whether a "labor dispute" exists
where an outside union pickets and carries on boycott activities
where no controversy exists between the employer and his em-
ployees or the union representing them. 9 Probably the preponder-
ance of authority, and the federal view, is that a "labor dispute"
exists and that injunction may not issue against peaceful labor
warfare. Under this authority a jurisdictional dispute probably is
a "labor dispute," and the employer's prospects of securing an
injunction are slim. The passage of the NLRA in 1935 compli-
cated the picture, since unions engaged in jurisdictional (or inter-
union) disputes occasionally are in the position of seeking ends
inconsistent with the administration of the Act. But the NLRA has
the same definition of "labor dispute" as the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, and the courts generally have striven to give effect to both
pieces of legislation.
The statutory limitations of jurisdiction of the federal courts to
-9 Cases holding that a "labor dispute" exists: Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union,
19 F. Supp. 607 (D. C. D. Minn. 1937) ; Grace Co. v. Williams, 96 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A.
8th 1938) ; Houston & N. T. Motor Freight Lines v. Local Union, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, etc., 24 F. Supp. 619 (W. D. Okla. 1938) ; Fur Workers Union v. Fur
Workers Union, 105 F. (2d) I (App. D. C. 1939), afTd, 308 U. S. 522 (1939); Wish-
netzky Food Products v. Osman, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 750 (1941) ; Stone Logging & Contract-
ing Co. v. International Woodworkers, etc., 171 Or. 13, 135 P. (2d) 759 (1943). This
rule has been applied even though the employees were represented by a labor union
which had been duly certified as the sole bargaining agent by the appropriate labor rela-
tions board: Stalban v. Friedman, 259 App. Div. 520,19 N. Y. S. (2d) 978 (1940); Yeorg
Brewing Co. v. Brennan, 59 F. Supp. 625 (D. C. Minn. 1945); American Chain & Cable
Co., Inc. v. Truck Drivers & Helpers Union, etc., 68 F. Supp. 54 (D. C. D. N. J. 1946).
Cases denying that a "labor dispute exists: Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies
Garment Workers' Union, 20 F. Supp. 761, 21 F. Supp. 807 (W. D. Mo. 1937), vacated
on other grounds by 304 U. S. 243 (1938) ; John F. Trommer, Inc. v. Brotherhood of
Brewery Workers, 167 Misc. 197, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 782 (1938) ; Spinner v. Doe, 13 N. Y. S.
(2d) 449 (1939); Coward Shoe, lnc. v. Retail Shoe Salemen's Union, 177 Misc. 781, 31
N. Y. S. (2d) 781 (1941) ; London Character Shoe Corp. v. Davis, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 807
(1941), afJd, 263 App. Div. 865, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 793 (1942). The tendency has been
marked not to find a "labor dispute" where one union has been certified as exclusive bar-
gaining agent and defendant union is an "outsider": Obernan & Co. v. United Garment
Workers, 21 F. Supp. 20 (W. D. Mo. 1937) ; Euclid Candy Co. v. Summa, 174 Misc. 19,
19 N. Y. S. (2d) 382 (1940), aft'd 259 App. Div. 1081, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 614 (1940);
Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen Union, 288 N. Y. 188, 42 N. E. (2d)
480 (1942) ; Regal Shoe Co. v. Doyle, 179 Misc. 696, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 666 (1943) ; Mark-
ham & Callow v. International Woodworkers, etc.. 170 Or. 517, 135 P. (2d) 727 (1943);
Sachs Quality Furniture v. Hensley, 269 App. Div. 264, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 450 (1945);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 185 Misc. 409, 57 N. Y. S. (2d)
24 (1945).
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deal with labor disputes did not mean Congress did not have con-
stitutional power to provide for federal intervention in major
industrial disturbances. The National Labor Relations Act, re-
cently amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, empowers the Board to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
affecting commerce."0 And in determining the constitutional bounds
of authority conferred on the Board, it is the effect upon interstate
or foreign commerce and not the source of the injury that is the
criterion.'" Activities which when separately considered are intra-
state may become subject to national authority when they have a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce." - The judicial
power of the United States also extends to all controversies, in-
cluding labor disputes, where diversity of citizenship exists. It is
apparent that federal power is ample to cope with jurisdictional
disputes; it is the statutory restraints upon exercise of this power
which prevents effective treatment of these disputes.
In summary, it may be said that in the federal and state courts
where anti-injunction statutes are in force, the primary considera-
tion is whether the court will find the existence of a "labor dis-
pute," as defined. As previously noted, there is a split of authority
as to whether or hot a jurisdictional strike is a "labor dispute."
It has also been seen that the NLRB refused to act where a juris-
dictional strike was involved, preferring to leave the matter to
the decision of the parent body. But even where the Board has
certified a majority representative," the cases conflict as to whether
or not a "labor dispute" exists where the employer seeks an in-
junction against the minority union."
Another avenue to the solution of jurisdictional disputes was
closed when the United States Supreme Court decided in U. S. v.
4 o49 STAr. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (1940).
4" Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. N. L R. B., 305 U. S. 197 (1940).
42 N. L R. B. v. Henry Levaur, Inc., 115 F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 1st 1940), cert. denied,
312 U. S. 682 (1940).
4 Southwestern Public Service Co., 58 N. L IL B. 926 (1944) ; W. H. Kistler Station-
ery Co., 51N. L R. B. 978 (1943).
44 E.g., Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan. 59 F. Supp. 625 (D. C. Minn. 1945).
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Hutcheson4 1 that because of the Clayton Act and the Norris-La-
Guardia Act the criminal provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Law" did not apply to a contest between two unions, both af-
filiated with the AFL. This case was a prosecution against one of
two rival unions in a manufacturing plant for striking and carry-
ing on a boycott causing union members and their friends through-
out the country not to use the employer's product. The employer
urged that the defendant union's activities were an unlawful re-
straint of interstate commerce. But the Court ruled in favor of
defendant union saying that the conduct of the union must be
treated in the same way as if it were carried on for increased
wages, shorter hours, or improved working conditions.
"The fact that what was done was done in a competition for jobs
against the Machinist rather than against, let us say, a company union
is a differentiation which Congress has not put into federal legislation
and which therefore we cannot write into it."''4
The object that Congress had in view in passing the Norris-La-
Guardia Act, said the Court, was to restore a liberal judicial
policy toward organized labor which it had attempted to do in
the Clayton Act but which had been thwarted by unduly restric-
tive judicial construction limiting exemption from anti-trust prose-
cution only where the parties stood in the proximate relationship
of employer and employee."' In view of the broad definition of
"labor dispute" in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Clayton Act
gives protection to the conduct it describes although directed in
part against persons not immediately party to the labor dispute.
Violence and trespass by a labor organization attempting to union-
ize the business of an employer has likewise been held without the
purview of the Sherman Act."'
45312 U. S. 219 (1941).
4626 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1940).
17 312 U. S. 219, 233 (1941).
is See Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 433 (1921).
"9 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 (1939).
[Vol. 2
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RESORT TO THE NEW LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Prior to the 1947 amendment of the National Labor Relations
Act, the NLRB operated under the assumption that since the law
did not direct that it exercise its powers, it was within its discre-
tion whether or not it would determine the appropriate bargain-
ing unit of a group of workers when requested to do so." The
courts agreed with the Board in this interpretation of its powers."
The Board relaxed its rule of non-intervention in jurisdictional
disputes where it was apparent that the dispute would continue
indefinitely unless the Board acted. Where the record disclosed a
jurisdictional dispute of long duration." where the parent organ-
ization had failed to act,"6 where one of the disputing unions re-
fused to recognize the superior authority of the parent body,"4 or
where a third union not a party to the jurisdictional dispute was
a contestant for bargaining rights, 5 the Board proceeded with
representation hearings.
By a specific provision of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, the NLRB is directed to hear and determine jurisdictional
disputes. 6 The jurisdictional dispute, defined in broad terms, is
classed as an unfair labor practice on the part of unions.5 Where
'5 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (1940 1.
51 Solvay Process Co. v. N. L. R. B., 117 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 5th 1911) ; cert. denied,
313 U. S. 596 (1941).
52 W. H. Kistler Stationery Co., 51 N. L. R. B. 978 (1943) ; B. F. Gilmour Co.. Inc.,
55 N. L. R. B. 767 (19441 ; Curran Printing Co.. 57 N. L. R. B. 185 (1944).
53 Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.. 66 N. L. R. B. 25 (1946,.
.14 Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 43 N. L. R. B. 936,.44 N. L. R. B. 343 (1942).
55 Long Bell Lumber Co.. 16 N. L. R. B. 892 (1939. ; Campbell, Wyant and Cannon
Foundry Co., 32 N. L. R. B. 416 (1941): Loew's, Inc. (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios),
52 N. L. R. B. 1453 (1943).
56 Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Congress, 1st Sess. (June 23, 1947) § 10(k).
57 Id. §8(b) (4) (D). The Act provides: "Section 8(b). It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents ... (4) to engage in, or to induce or encour-
age the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, or materials, or commodities or to perform any services,
where an object thereof is... (D, forcing or requiring any employer to assign partic-
ular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft,
or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft,
or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the
Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work."
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a charge of unfair labor practice is made, the Board has power to
seek a restraining order or injunction in the appropriate federal
district court. 8 Indeed, it is the duty of the regional officer to
seek an injunction as to some unfair labor practices, but this is
not true as to the jurisdictional dispute.
The federal courts are relieved of the fetters of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act where the Board seeks an injunction against an
unfair labor practice. 9 The NLRB is authorized to petition for in-
junction, and the court to grant it, where any unfair labor practice
has been charged and a complaint issued, in order to restrain the
the continuance of the unfair labor practice during the adjudication
of the issues raised by the charge."0 An important change in the new
law is the creation of the position of General Counsel of the NLRB
as an independent office, filled by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The General Counsel is given final authority
by the Act to decide whether or not action shall be taken with re-
spect to a charge of unfair labor practices. He also supervises the
regional offices of the Board. The decision as to whether a com-
plaint should issue will rest ultimately with the General Counsel,
the Board acting only as a rule making body and in a judicial
capacity in cases brought before it.
Any appraisal of the future effect upon labor relations of the
power placed in the hands of the General Counsel of the Board
in regard to petitions for injunction in unfair labor practice cases
should take into consideration a recent statement made by the
General Counsel."' He said that he did not believe Congress in-
serted the provision for the use of injunctive powers with the idea
that an injunction should be invoked as a sort of preliminary
cease and desist order every time a labor organization (or em-
ployer) is charged with unfair labor practices. He recognized




61 N. L. R. B. Release R-4, September 23, 1947.
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brought about the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The new
Act, like the old National Labor Relations Act, does not set up or
recognize any private rights. The purpose of the legislation is to
serve the public and to preserve public rights. Therefore, before
an injunction will be requested primary consideration will be
given to the effect of the alleged unfair labor practices on thc
public at large.
Under the new NLRB Regulations issued under the amended
Act, the Board has assigned second priority to the handling of
jurisdictional disputes." Only complaints involving strikes or
boycotts for purposes such as securing recognition of a minority
union are given a higher priority. When a union engages in a strike
or boycott to force an employer to transfer work to its members, or
is encouraging employees to engage in such a strike or boycott, an
employer, rival union, or an employee may file a charge at the
regional office of the Board."' If the preliminary investigation
indicates the case has merit, the Regional Director sends the
parties a notice of a Board hearing, including a simple statement
of the issues. The hearing is set for not less than ten days after
receipt of the notice.6" The parties are expected to try to settle the
dispute during this time, and if they do settle within the ten days,
the charge is dismissed. 5
If they do not settle, a hearing is held before a hearing officer.
As in representation cases, the hearing is informal, and court
rules of evidence do not apply. The hearing officer seeks to acquire
all the pertinent facts and then sends to the Board an analysis of
the evidence"0 without recommendation. The Board studies the
62 NEw N. L. R. B. REGULATIONS, effective August 22, 1947, § 203.74.
63 Ibid. In his veto message to Congress on June 20, 1947, President Truman said:
"The bill would force unions to strike or to boycott if they wish to have a jurisdictional
dispute settled by the National Labor Relations Board. This peculiar situation results
from the fact that the Board is given authority to determine jurisdictional disputes over
assignment of work only after such disputes have been converted into strikes or boycotts."
64 Ibid.
r5 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L No. 101, 80th Congress, 1st Session
(June 23, 1947) §10(k).
66 NEw N. L. R. B. REGULATIONS, effective August 22, 1947, § 203.59.
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evidence and then certifies what union, trade, craft, or class of
employees is to perform the work in dispute."' The charge is dis-
missed if the parties comply." If the parties do not comply, ie
Regional Director issues a formal complaint, and the case pro-
ceeds to hearing before a trial examiner, as any other complaint
case. This hearing can be speedy since much of the evidence has
already been presented in the first hearing and is officially part
of the case."'
As soon as he has issued the complaint, the Regional Director
may apply to a federal district court for an injunction to main-
tain the status quo. Under the statute and the Board's procedures,
he has power to apply within the first days of the case, as soon
as he has reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true."
But in the interest of voluntary settlement, he probably will not
seek an injunction until the complaint stage.
If the Board issues an order to cease and desist and a federal
circuit court of appeals enforces it, the respondent union will be
enjoined from bringing pressure to bear on an employer either
by refusal to work or to handle his products or by encouraging
the employees to refuse. After a Board order has been enforced
by a court decree, the Board has the responsibility of obtaining
compliance with the decree. Investigation is made by the Regional
Office of the respondent's efforts to comply. If it finds that the
respondent has failed to live up to the terms of the court's decree,
the General Counsel may, on behalf of the Board, petition the
court to hold the offender in contempt of court. The court may
order immediate remedial action and impose sanctions and
penalties. The Act does not make the commission of an unfair
labor practice or failure to observe a Board order a criminal
67 Id., 203.76.
s8 Id, § 203.77.
69 Id., I 203.45.
TO Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, note 65 supra, § 10(1) ; N-w N. L. R. B.
REcuLArxoNs, note 66 supra, § 202.35.
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offense. It is only after an injunction is obtained from the court
that penalties may be imposed for non-compliance.
Another deterrent placed upon jurisdictional disputes by the
Act is a section which declares such strikes unlawful and allows
anyone injured thereby to sue for damages in any federal dis-
trict court without respect to the amount in controversy.7 A money
judgment secured against a labor organization in a federal dis-
trict court is enforceable only against the organization as an
entity and against its assets and is not enforceable against any
individual member or his assets."2 The fact that this section de-
clares the jurisdictional strike unlawful does not confer a right
to private injunctive relief because the Norris-LaGuardia Act is
still applicable except when the General Counsel for the Board
brings action."
STATE LEGISLATION TO CONTROL THE JURISDICTIONAL STRIKE
The year 1947 was one of extensive changes in the labor laws
of a large number of states.7" Measures seeking to control the
jurisdictional dispute have been among the new statutes passed.
California, 7 Delaware,"6 Iowa,77 Massachusetts,7" Missouri,79 Penn-
sylvania," and Texas"1 have declared the jurisdictional strike un-
lawful and enjoinable. A Florida statute, passed in 1943, provides
that it is unlawful to interfere with work by reason of any juris-
dictional dispute, grievance or dikagtreement between or within
71 Labor Management Reltaions Act, 1947, note supra, H 303(a) and 303(b).
72 Id., § 301 (b).
33 93 Co-,c. REC. 5073, 5074 (1947).
74 Compilation of State Labor Laws 1947, prepared by Committee on State Labor
Relations, Section of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Association.
T3 Ch. 1388, L. 1947, approved July 12, 1947, effective September 19, 1947.
76 H. B. 212, Laws of 1947, approved and effective April 5, 1947.
77 S. B. 111, L. 1947, approved April 29, 1947, effective upon publication.
7 Ch. 571, L. 1947, approved and effective June 25, 1947.
79 S. B. 79, L. 1947, approved July 22, 1947, effective September 10, 1947.
80 Act of July 7, 1947, Act No. 558, effective July 7, 1947.
81 Ch. 138, L. 1947, approved May 1, 1947, effective September 5, 1947. Ch. 387, L
1947, approved June 13, 1947. effective September 5, 1947.
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labor organizations." Idaho has amended its anti-injunction act,
modeled after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, so as to limit the term
"labor dispute" to controversies between an employer and the
majority of his employees in a collective unit.83 The Utah State
Labor Relations Act, based on the National Labor Relations Act,
has made it an unfair labor practice for employees to coerce or
induce any employer to discriminate against the bargaining agent
representing a majority of his employees.'
Two Texas statutes passed in 1947 provide that strikes and
picketing against an employer when there is no labor dispute
between him and a majority of his employees as to wages, hours,
or working conditions are forbidden. Violations are criminal
offenses and enjoinable. It is also unlawful for anyone to engage
in picketing the purpose of which is to secure the violation of a
valid labor agreement between an employer and the representa-
tives designated for the purpose of collective bargaining or certi-
fied as the bargaining agent under the National Labor Relations
Act.
CONCLUSION
Any prediction of the probable success or failure of the recent
federal and state legislation on labor matters would be conjec-
tural at this time. It will be, of course, several years before the
principles of the acts are authoritatively established. Prior to the
enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, in the
broad field of federal cognizance, the jurisdictional dispute was
a controversy without a tribunal. Neither the parent organiza-
tions, courts, nor administrative agencies provided an effective
solution to this difficult problem. Some measure of relief was ob-
viously needed.
The new federal legislation has injected the government into
82 Section 9, Ch. 21968, L 1943.
83 Section 12, Ch. 215, L. 1933, as amended by Ch. 266, L 1947, approved March 19,
1947, effective May 6, 1947.
84 Sections 49-1-19-49-1-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Ch. 55, L 1937, approved
and effective March 22,1937.
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jurisdictional conflicts in order to determine the issues. This is
compulsory abritration. It is doubtful that all jurisdictional dis-
putes can be solved by means of administrative procedural regula-
tions. For each case where the solution to the dispute is obvious,
there will be many cases where, on both legal and practical grounds,
the exercise of jurisdiction by government agencies would be of
doubtful value. No one actually believes that industrial peace
can be achieved by governmental mandate. To sew up the wound
without first removing the source of infection would be to cause
a more serious rupture than if no surgery had been attempted.
The real solution to this as well as many other labor problems
must come from within the labor movement. The principal pur-
pose that the government can serve is that of fact finding and
conciliation.
Governmental regulation of labor organizations was delayed
several years because of the then recognized inequality of bar-
gaining power of labor as compared with capital. When that
bargaining power achieved a parity, or-as some believed-a
superiority, it was to be expected that some abuses would become
the subject of legislative regulation. But the labor union has a
definite place in our economy, and it will continue to play a vital
role in the future. The government has not ceased to protect and
foster organized labor. There is no reason to believe that the pres-
ent or a future administration will be hostile to labor. Short-
sighted and biased legislation is to be condemned as a retrogres-
sive step. But legislation needed to curb apparent abuses by the
labor bosses, if prudently administered. should be a boon to
labor as well as the public.
The jurisdictional dispute presents an acknowledged challenge
to those charged with administering our new labor policy. The
NLRB plans to make its policy as the cases are presented and
decided. It will be a matter of trial and error for a while. Every
one interested in labor-management relations is watching the
current developments closely during this formulative period. The
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Board has been given some powerful tools with which to work,
and with a little cooperation from both sides of a labor contro-
versy there is every reason to believe that it can be effective in
the accomplishment of its objectives.
-Lionel E. Gilly.
